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Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

did not compel Whitman to find a violation, and Congress likely used
the word shall as instructive rather than compulsory language.
The court criticized the Sierra Club's argument on three fronts.
First, the court upheld the presumption that an agency's refusal to
investigate or enforce statutory violations lies within that agency's
discretion. Next, it reasoned the agency's limited resources, and the
high number of potential investigations it could face, forced the
Administrator to balance priorities and act only on serious violations.
Finally, the court determined Whitman's decision not to take
enforcement measure was of the type "typically committed to the
agency's absolute discretion." Therefore, the court held "[when] used
in a statute that prospectively affects government action" such as the
CWA, the word shall sometimes carried only the connotations of the
word "may," and did not mandate action.
In further justification of its ruling, the court noted the CWA's
provision allowing citizens to file their own suits against polluters
suggested no congressional intention to mandate government action
for every alleged violation. The court also scrutinized the legislative
history of the CWA for any indicia of a congressional intent to
mandate EPA action via the act, but found no compelling evidence to
suggest this. Accordingly, the court deemed the Sierra Club's claim
outside the scope of judicial review and dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.
Daniel C. Wennogle

Natural Res. Def. Council v. United States EPA, 279 F.3d 1180 (9th
Cir. 2002) (holding that the Environmental Protection Agency erred
by not providing the public with notice of or the opportunity to
comment on changes included in final permits to release bark and
woody debris into marine waters when those changes were not a
logical outgrowth of the draft permits).
The Natural Resources Defense Council ("NRDC") brought this
action against the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") for
failing to provide the public with notice of and the opportunity to
comment on changes the EPA approved in two final National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permits.
The permits
authorized Alaskan logging transfer facilities ("LTFs") to discharge
bark and woody debris into marine waters. NRDC asserted that
interested parties could not have reasonably anticipated the changes
EPA approved in the final permits. The EPA claimed references
within the draft permits were sufficient to put interested parties on
notice of the changes.
The Alaskan timber industry transports most of its logs to markets
through marine waters. During transportation, friction between logs,
water, and the bottom of the water body causes the discharge of bark
and woody debris. The debris, which can accumulate in significant
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concentrations, deteriorates water quality, creates problems for marine
life and decays slowly.
In the mid-1990s, the EPA proposed a new, general permit that
would apply to all LTFs in the state. Final approval of the proposed
permit was conditioned upon the Alaska Department of
Environmental Conservation's ("ADEC") certification of the permit.
In its final draft certification, ADEC made substantive changes to the
permit that had not appeared in its first or second draft certifications,
but ADEC did not provide the public with notice or an opportunity to
comment on the changes. Although the EPA expressed concern with
the modifications, the Agency not only accepted ADEC's certification,
but also finalized the rule without providing an opportunity for
interested parties to comment. As a result, NRDC sued the EPA for
failing to provide adequate notice and opportunity for comment as
required by the Administrative Procedure Act.
This court decided the adequacy of the notice and comment
procedure by noting the differences between the draft and final
permits and analyzing whether interested parties would have
reasonably anticipated the changes in the final rule as logical
outgrowths of the draft permit.
Several differences between the draft and final permits led the
court to determine that the EPA's notice was inadequate. First, the
EPA's draft permit limited LTFs to a one-acre zone of discharge.
ADEC's final draft certification, however, imposed no specific limit on
the size of the zones into which LTFs could discharge bark and woody
debris. Despite an express concern that ADEC's changes to its draft
permit were substantive and might not comply with antidegradation
laws, the EPA accepted the changes without public notice or comment.
Second, the EPA originally proposed a general permit that applied
to nearly all LTFs but later adopted ADEC's proposal, which created a
more lax permitting scheme for LTFs in existence prior to October 22,
1985. ADEC's final draft certification exempted pre-1985 LTFs from
applying for a permit to discharge. Instead of applying for a permit,
LTFs only had to notify the EPA they were conducting activities that
resulted in the release of bark and woody debris. This decision was
ironic; the EPA initiated the permitting process because the permits of
pre-1985 LTFs did not comply with the Clean Water Act.
Third, there were considerable differences between the comments
made in reference to the draft permit and those NRDC later raised in
its petition. The court found these differences were a result of the
inadequacy of EPA's notice and comment procedures.
In analyzing each of these factors, the court found that the public
could not have reasonably anticipated the differences between the
draft and final permits. That is, the final permit was not a logical
outgrowth of the draft permit. As a result, the court remanded the
permits to the EPA for further proceedings.
Merc Pittinos

